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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3481  
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 4790  
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 4747  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004336

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [SCUL](#) [IN](#)  
SUBJECT: COMMUNISTS HOPE TO "CAPITALIZE" ON NAXALITE  
INSURGENCY

REF: A. NEW DELHI 4202  
[1](#)B. NEW DELHI 4253

Classified By: Acting PolCouns Atul Keshap for reasons 1.4 (B,D)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: Communist ideologues view the resurgent Naxalite movement as a potential political windfall. Looking closely at events in Nepal, they have concluded that the Indian Naxalites could eventually reform, join the Indian mainstream and ally with the Communists. The non-Maoist Communist parties want to be ready for this eventuality by expanding their presence into the 13 states where Naxalites are currently active. The Communists have also noted that the Naxalites have driven Congress and the BJP out of large areas of these states, leaving a political vacuum that they could fill. The tribal-dominated governments in the new states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and other states with large tribal populations are also weak and could fall, if the "offices of profit" controversy begins to take its toll (Reftel B). These Communist concerns underlie the Left Front's June 15 demands that the UPA end its "Salwa Judum" (peace campaign) counterinsurgency strategy in Chhattisgarh and consult with the LF before deploying security forces anywhere in the country to counter Naxalites. Such decisions by the Left lead many right-wingers in India to mutter darkly that the Communists' loyalty to the Indian state is questionable. End Summary.

More Than Meets the Eye

[1](#)2. (U) On June 15, the Left and Congress leadership held a "coordination meeting" to discuss implementation of the Common Minimum Program (CMP), at which the Left Front (LF) presented a nine-page "report-card" on the performance of the UPA government (Reftel A). Unlike previous conclaves, the June 15 meeting was concerned with more than economic and

foreign policy. The Communist and Congress leaders also discussed a broad range of internal security issues, including the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), the UPA approach to religious tensions, Kashmir policy, the ongoing insurgencies in Northeast India, and the GOI approach to Naxalism (Maoist insurgency).

#### Unreported Demands on the UPA

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¶3. (SBU) This added emphasis reflected the Left's increasing concern with internal security issues. Although it did not receive much media attention, the LF demanded that in the future, the GOI consult with it before taking important internal security decisions and deploying security forces anywhere in the country. The LF also demanded that the GOI extend the same deferential treatment to Indian Naxalites as Maoists are currently getting in Nepal and called for an end to "Salwa Judum" (state-sponsored counter-insurgency campaigns) in Chattisgarh).

#### Plans for Expansion

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¶4. (C) "Hindu" editor Harish Khare maintained to us that the Communists' new emphasis on internal security stems from Communist intentions to expand politically from their "red forts" in Kerala and West Bengal into the tribal-dominated region between the Ganges and Godavari rivers (Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, eastern parts of Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh).

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Freelance Journalist (and former editor of "India Today") Zafar Agha noted that his Communist ideologue contacts have concluded that the increasing Naxalite activity in this region will ultimately benefit them by laying the groundwork for a grassroots Communist movement and increasing Communist influence over the functioning of key national security agencies and the powerful Ministry of Home Affairs.

#### The Nepal Precedent

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¶5. (C) "Hard News" editor Sanjay Kapoor informed us that his Communist contacts consider the success of Maoists in Nepal as an opportunity to expand their political base into the 13 states in which the Naxalites are currently active, as the Naxalites will eventually follow the example of their Nepali cousins, turn away from violence and enter the parliamentary system. The Communists hope to be ready when this happens, and plan either to absorb reformed Naxalites into revived Communist parties in these states, or follow the Nepalese model and form a Communist alliance that includes Maoist and non-Maoist parties. Kapoor maintained that the Communists have also determined that the Maoist resurgence in the tribal-dominated region has effectively driven Congress and BJP from these states, leaving a political vacuum that both they and the Maoists can fill.

#### Naxalite Sympathies Condemned by the BJP

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¶6. (U) The Communist stance was soundly condemned on June 20 by BJP spokesman Prakash Javadekar, who charged the Left with being "pro-naxal" and "anti-tribal" for its demand that the UPA end the "Salwa Judum" campaign. Javadekar pointed out that the Left takes a "duplicious stand" on Naxalite insurgency, as it adopts a hard anti-Naxalite position in West Bengal and is sympathetic towards them in other states. Javadekar characterized "Salwa Judum" as a legitimate "peoples' movement" against Maoist violence that was supported widely by the BJP and Congress.

#### Comment: Substance to the Theory

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17. (C) While the Communists' plans appear unrealistic, when one considers the history of violence between the Maoists and the Marxists in West Bengal, they should be taken seriously, as the Naxalites and the parliamentary Communist parties share a common origin. The Naxalites split from the CPI-M in 1967, dubbing the party as a "capitulationist, capitalist-roader and a "lackey of the bourgeoisie," for renouncing violent revolution. This does not mean, however, that they will necessarily be permanently at loggerheads. Leftist parties the world over suffer from ideological factionalism, resulting in a constant turmoil of alliances and splits. In recent years, the Naxalites have received more sympathy from their ideological big-brothers. Although the Maoists remain hostile to the Communists, a future shift should not be ruled out. The Communists have also determined that the current governments in most of these tribal-dominated smaller states are not stable and are threatened by the office of profit issue (Reftel A). The fall of these governments would lead to midterm polls, and the Left would be tempted to test the waters by putting forth a strong slate of Legislative Assembly candidates. The Maoist response to such a move would be a good indicator of possible future cooperation between these factions. Such a scenario gives Congress and the BJP fits, while many

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right-wingers see the Left's overtures to the Maoists as nothing shy of sedition, calling into question, in their eyes, the Communists' loyalty to the Union of India.

18. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:  
(<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/>)  
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